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Ensuring Long-TErm 
DaTa inTEgriTy
The European Train Control System (ETCS) is the leading signaling sys-tem for train command and control. In the future, ETCS may be deliv-ered over long-term evolution (LTE) networks. Thus, LTE performance offered to ETCS must be analyzed and confronted with the railway safety 
requirements. It is especially important to ensure the integrity of the ETCS 
data, i.e., to protect ETCS data against loss and corruption. In this article, vari-
ous retransmission mechanisms are considered for providing end-to-end ETCS 
data integrity in LTE. These mechanisms are validated in simulations, which 
model worst-case conditions regarding train locations, traffic load, and base-
station density. The simulation results show that ETCS data integrity require-
ments can be fulfilled even under these unfavorable conditions with the proper 
LTE mechanisms.
ETCS Data Integrity Requirements Can Be Fulfilled Even under 
Unfavorable Conditions with the Proper LTE Mechanisms
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Communication Technologies for ETCS
Railway signaling is gradually migrating from trackside 
colored-light signals toward fully digital in-cab signal-
ing systems with automatic train control [1]. ETCS, 
which is the leading digital signaling system, is gaining 
significant international popularity. In Europe—for reg-
ulatory reasons—ETCS is deployed on all new and 
modernized railway lines. In other countries around 
the world, ETCS is often chosen for technical and eco-
nomic reasons [1].
Communication between ETCS elements is currently 
provided by Global System for Mobile Communications-Rail-
ways (GSM-R). These two elements—ETCS and GSM- R—
form the European Railway Traffic Management System 
(ERTMS). Despite being designed specifically for railways, 
GSM-R is already an outdated technology. Its shortcomings 
have been widely recognized in the literature and technical 
reports [2], [3]. The major issues of GSM-R are 1) insufficient 
capacity, 2) inefficient usage of network resources, and 3) 
limited support for data communication. For example, bursty 
ETCS data traffic is delivered over circuit-switched data 
calls. Thus, each ETCS-equipped train requires a dedicated 
data call that continuously occupies radio and backbone re-
sources as long as that train is operating. ETCS messages 
are relatively infrequent and short, so the network resources 
reserved for these ETCS data calls are underutilized. There-
fore, alternative technologies, which would bring higher ca-
pacity and efficiency, are being considered to replace GSM-R 
in the future [1]–[5].
LTE is one of the likely candidates to replace GSM-R 
[4], [5], since it offers many advantages in terms of ca-
pacity and data-transmission capabilities [6]. Moreover, 
LTE [and LTE-advanced (LTE-A)] is the latest family of 
Third-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standards. 
Thus, it has much lower obsolescence risk than any ear-
lier standards, such as the Universal Mobile Telecom-
munications System. Besides, since both GSM and LTE 
are 3GPP standards, interworking mechanisms between 
these two networks are well defined [6]. This means that 
migration from GSM-R to LTE would be easier than mi-
gration to other technology.
Although the first proposals to replace GSM-R with 
LTE had already emerged by 2010 [7], [8], the literature 
on this topic is still relatively scarce. Most of the pub-
lications on LTE in a railway environment are focused 
on transmission performance under high-speed condi-
tions—tackling problems caused by Doppler shift [9]–
[11] and by frequent base-station handovers [12], [13]. 
However, these publications only considered LTE as a 
commercial network for the passengers on board the 
train—not as a replacement for GSM-R. This is a sig-
nificant difference because, in the latter role, LTE must 
fulfill specific ERTMS and ETCS requirements on trans-
mission performance and reliability. Therefore, despite 
the well-known benefits of LTE, this technology has to be 
explicitly validated in railway scenarios.
Only a few research works explicitly analyzed LTE as a 
possible network for the future ERTMS. Notably, publica-
tions by Liem and Mendiratta [14], Calle-Sanchez et al. [5], 
and Zayas et al. [15] considered LTE as a solution for pro-
viding voice communication in ERTMS-based railways. 
Then, in publications by Sniady and Soler [4] and Sniady 
et al. [16], LTE was considered as a network for ETCS com-
munication. It has been established that LTE fulfills the 
ETCS requirement on message transfer delay under vari-
ous conditions. However, one of these studies [16] also 
revealed that a densely deployed LTE network may not 
fulfill ETCS requirements on data integrity. ETCS data loss 
exceeded the maximum acceptable value. Hence, data 
protection mechanisms in LTE, such as retransmission, 
must be investigated further. 
The goal of this article is to analyze the performance 
of the built-in LTE retransmission mechanisms and com-
pare them with an end-to-end retransmission mechanism 
dedicated to ETCS. This analysis should show if ETCS data 
integrity can be ensured in LTE, even if the underlying 
physical transmission is unreliable.
ETCS and Its Transmission 
Requirements
The ETCS architecture (Level 2) [1] is 
shown in Figure 1. The main ETCS logic is 
placed in the radio block center (RBC) 
server. The RBC decides how trains are 
allowed to move in its supervised area. 
To make its decisions, the RBC must 
have real-time information about the 
supervised area.
Each ETCS train is equipped with an 
onboard unit (OBU). The OBU is respon-
sible for informing the RBC about train lo-
cation, speed, and direction. This is done 
through ETCS location update messages 
Point MachinesAxel CountersEurobalises
Railway
Communication
Network
OBU
RBC
InterlockingeNodeB
Figure 1 the EtcS architecture. the EtcS level 2 is shown because it is the level that 
will be used in Denmark.
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sent from the OBU to the RBC. The RBC must also be 
informed about the state of interlocking elements, such 
as axel counters and point machines (this is provided 
over nonstandardized wired interfaces). Based on all 
that information, the RBC can make decisions on which 
trains can be allowed to drive. These decisions are com-
municated to the OBU via ETCS movement authority 
(MA) messages. It should be noted that more types of 
messages are exchanged within the ETCS (e.g., configu-
ration messages during system start). However, location 
update and MA are the most important and the most 
frequent ones because they provide the core functional-
ity of the system (i.e., management of train movement). 
The ETCS also includes Eurobalises, which are passive 
elements used by trains for establishing their position 
along the tracks.
The goal of ETCS is to ensure safe and efficient train 
movement. To fulfill this goal, reliable low-delay commu-
nication between the ETCS elements is required. If ETCS 
data are corrupted, lost, or cannot be delivered within a 
certain time period, the system loses information about 
train locations and their movement state. Thus, a poten-
tially dangerous situation occurs. In such a case, trains 
must be preventively stopped until communication is re-
stored. This is highly undesirable, since it causes timeta-
ble disruptions. Moreover, any uncontrolled state always 
poses a safety risk.
Due to these safety and efficiency concerns, the un-
derlying network must fulfill strict requirements on the 
performance of ETCS message transmission. Currently, 
in the GSM-R network, ETCS messages are delivered over 
circuit-switched data calls. Hence, ETCS requirements, so 
far, are defined only for circuit-switched transmission [17]. 
LTE, on the other hand, is a packet-switched network. The 
performance offered by LTE cannot be compared directly 
with the current requirements. Thus, in this article, tenta-
tive ETCS requirements for packet-switched transmission 
are used, as defined by the Banedanmark (Rail Net Den-
mark) Signalling Programme [17]. 
There are two requirements that are relevant for this 
article. First, the probability of an end-to-end ETCS data 
loss cannot exceed 1 # 10-4. Second, the average end-
to-end ETCS message delay cannot exceed 500 ms (with 
95% probability; for a message size of 128 B). Other ETCS 
requirements are related to the delay of various network 
procedures (e.g., registration) and are out of scope in 
this article. 
Previous research showed that the average ETCS 
delay in an LTE network is below 50 ms [4], [16]. Thus, 
it is an order of magnitude smaller than the maximum 
acceptable delay of 500 ms [17]. This large difference 
creates a delay budget, which can be used by retransmis-
sion mechanisms. Thus, thanks to these mechanisms, 
it should be possible to prevent a data loss without ex-
ceeding the maximum acceptable delay.
Packet Loss Prevention in a Railway LTE Network
An LTE network consists of a wireless radio access net-
work and a wired backhaul network. Due to its nature, 
the radio part of the network is much more prone to 
disruptions and, as a consequence, transmission errors. 
These disruptions can be caused, for instance, by noise, 
interference, or signal shadowing. To minimize errors in 
the wireless transmission, LTE continuously adapts the 
modulation and coding scheme (MCS) used on the 
radio link. The goal is to choose an MCS that provides 
the highest possible throughput, while keeping the 
transmission error probability acceptably low. 
The radio link adaptation in LTE is configured with a 
specific error probability target—usually 10% [6]. This 
target is not 0% for two reasons. First, no modulation or 
coding scheme is robust enough to ensure completely er-
ror-free transmission. Second, a limited amount of radio 
transmission errors is actually desired to get a higher 
radio throughput [6]. The higher the error target is, the 
less conservative (less robust) the chosen MCS. This in-
creases the error probability at the radio link. However, 
at the same time, the successful part of the transmission 
has much higher throughput than it would have with a 
conservative approach. An error probability target of 
10% maximizes the radio throughout [6].
Since a packet loss is always expected at the radio 
link, LTE must provide countermeasures: retransmission 
mechanisms at the media access control (MAC) and the 
radio link control (RLC) layers [18], as shown in Figure 2.
MAC Layer Retransmissions
The MAC layer uses a hybrid automatic repeat request 
(HARQ) mechanism. It is a default retransmission mech-
anism that protects all traffic transmitted over the LTE 
radio link. 
Whenever an LTE node sends a radio transport block, it 
expects to receive HARQ feedback from the receiver: an ac-
knowledgment (ACK) in the case of successful reception or 
a negative ACK (NACK) if the received block is erroneous 
and cannot be decoded. When the sender node receives 
an NACK, it attempts to retransmit the radio block. The 
retransmission may have higher redundancy (more error-
correcting bits) to increase the probability of successful 
reception. Moreover, it may use a more robust MCS.
To decode the frame, the receiver combines the sig-
nals received in each retransmission attempt. This also 
increases the probability of a successful data decoding, 
compared with a mechanism that would treat every re-
transmission attempt independently.
RLC Layer Retransmissions
The RLC layer may operate in transparent mode (TM), 
unacknowledged mode (UM), or acknowledged mode 
(AM). In TM, the RLC simply forwards the packets the 
between the upper and lower protocol layers.
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In UM, the RLC layer provides additional segmenta-
tion of packets forwarded from the upper layer. Then, 
at the receiver, RLC reassembles the packets from the 
segments delivered by the MAC layer. 
Besides this, the UM RLC ensures an in-
sequence delivery of packets, which may 
arrive out of order from the MAC layer. 
On top of UM functionality, AM adds 
an additional retransmission mechanism, 
which is engaged if the MAC’s HARQ re-
transmissions fail. The RLC mode is con-
figurable independently for each evolved 
packet system (EPS) bearer. Thus, traffic 
that is sensitive to a packet loss can be 
delivered over AM, while other traffic is 
delivered over UM or TM. 
Additional ETCS Layer Retransmissions
These two retransmission mechanisms at 
the MAC and RLC layers protect only the 
radio link. Thus, they cannot prevent 
packet losses—caused by congestion, buf-
fer overflows, transmission errors, or 
other random errors—in other parts of 
the network. Furthermore, mechanisms at MAC and RLC 
layers have a limited number of retransmission attempts. 
If all of the attempts are unsuccessful, the packet is irre-
versibly lost. Hence, another end-to-end protection layer 
might be required. 
In the model proposed here, this additional protec-
tion is provided by retransmissions at the application 
layer (ETCS). This mechanism within the protocol stack 
is shown in Figure 2, while an example of the mechanism 
operation is shown in Figure 3. Whenever an ETCS node 
sends a message, a timer is started. The sender node ex-
pects to receive a 5-B ACK from the receiver node. If the 
ACK does not arrive before the timer expires, the sender 
attempts to retransmit the message. It is possible to con-
figure the timer duration as well as the maximum num-
ber of retransmission attempts.
This end-to-end retransmission mechanism provides a 
similar functionality as EuroRadio data link layer. EuroRa-
dio is used in the GSM-R network to increase transmission 
reliability and security [1]. A similar end-to-end retrans-
mission mechanism could also be provided by the trans-
mission control protocol (TCP) transport protocol, if this 
was used instead of the user datagram protocol (UDP). 
However, most TCP procedures, such as flow control, 
congestion control, and slow-start, would be redundant 
for the infrequent low-rate ETCS. In addition, TCP would 
introduce more overhead due to the larger headers. Be-
sides, in the case of a packet loss, TCP retransmits the 
same packet. By using the retransmission mechanism at 
the application layer (ETCS), it is possible to retransmit 
the lost packet with updated information (e.g., with an up-
dated train position). Thus, in this work, UDP is used as a 
transport protocol, and the retransmissions are handled 
by the application layer. 
Location Update (01)
ACK 
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MA (0
2)
ACK (02)
Location Update (03)
Location Update (03)
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(Retransmission)
OBU RBC
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Figure 3 an example of an EtcS oBu–rBc message exchange 
with the end-to-end retransmission mechanism. the first two 
messages (location update 01 and ma 02) are delivered 
successfully before their retransmission timers expire. the third 
message (location update 03) is lost by the underlying transport 
network and does not arrive at the rBc. When the retransmission 
timer at oBu node expires, the location update 03 message is 
retransmitted.
eNodeB
UE/OBU
MAC
RLC
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MAC
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End-to-End Retransmissions
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Figure 2 a simplified ltE protocol stack. three available retransmission mechanisms are 
shown at the mac layer, at the rlc layer, and at the application layer (i.e., EtcS layer). 
PDcP: packet data convergence protocol. IP: Internet protocol.
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Simulation Scenarios and Cases
As presented in the previous section, there are multiple 
retransmission mechanisms available in LTE. The perfor-
mance of these mechanisms is evaluated using comput-
er-based simulations. The goal is to compare 
effectiveness of these mechanisms and to verify whether 
they provide sufficient end-to-end ETCS data integrity—
even in the worst-case scenario in terms of train loca-
tions and traffic load.
Simulation Setup
The simulations were conducted using OPNET Modeler 
version 17.5 PL3 [19]. The setup was based on an example 
using the Copenhagen, Denmark, main train station, and it 
followed a scenario presented in a previous publication 
[16]. In this simulation setup, the station was covered by 
an LTE radio network (currently, the station is covered by a 
GSM-R network). To model the worst-case conditions, the 
simulated radio network consisted of ten densely deployed 
eNodeBs (i.e., ten radio cells). The eNodeBs were placed 
linearly—following the shape of the station tracks. The sta-
tion is approximately 1-km long, so the distance between 
eNodeBs was 100 m, as shown in Figure 4. Such inter-eNo-
deB separation meant that a train passing through the sta-
tion at a typical speed of 60 km/h would have to perform 
an intercell handover every 3 s. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that more eNodeBs would be deployed, since passing 
trains would have to perform handovers even more fre-
quently—resulting in more signaling overhead.
In the simulations, 40 trains were placed at the sta-
tion. This is the upper bound for the number of trains 
expected simultaneously at the station in the peak hour 
in 2030 [4]. Thus, 40 is the worst-case assumption, and 
there should be fewer trains in everyday operation. 
In the simulations, each train was modeled as LTE 
user equipment (UE). All of the trains were placed at a 
distance of 50 m from the nearest eNodeB, as shown in 
Figure 4. This train distribution was the least favorable 
from the radio transmission point of view because most 
of the trains were located at the cell edges. As a con-
sequence, radio transmission had to use relatively high 
power to counteract path loss between trains (UEs) and 
eNodeBs. At the same time, trains associated with two 
different eNodeBs were in close vicinity of each other. 
This caused significant interference between transmis-
sions in the neighboring cells. 
All trains (UEs) in the simulation were modeled as sta-
tionary. This simplification was made for two reasons. 
First, thanks to the fixed positions, it was possible to ex-
ecute simulations multiple times, ensuring that the UEs 
remained in the same unfavorable positions (at the cell 
edges). Therefore, any change in the observed simula-
tion results were only due to the change in chosen pa-
rameters and mechanisms, not due to the randomness 
of UE positions. Second, most of the trains at the station 
stand by the platforms or drive at low speed. Therefore, 
their speed is of relatively little importance for the trans-
mission performance.
Other parameters used in the simulation are presented 
in Table 1. The main objective for the radio network con-
figuration was to ensure coverage over the whole station 
with the minimum reference signal received power above 
-92 dBm (railway radio coverage requirement [17]). 
Application Mix
The LTE network was used for communications between 
the OBUs and application servers, including the RBC. 
Five applications were provided by the network. Due to 
the purpose of this work, only the performance of ETCS 
signaling was analyzed. The remaining applications were 
used solely to generate background traffic. The timing 
and data rates were chosen so that the modeled applica-
tions generate realistic traffic that may be seen in the 
future railway network. The five applications were 
defined as follows (based on [16]).
■■ ETCS signaling: Each OBU was sending a 128-B mes-
sage to the RBC every 30 s, on average. Similarly, the 
RBC was sending a 128-B message to each of the 
OBUs every 30 s, on average. These messages could 
be location updates, MAs, or other ETCS message 
types (e.g., configuration data and train specification 
data). The average time between messages was set to 
30 s following assumptions given in [24, p. 155]. ETCS 
messages had a constant size of 128 B, according to 
the size specified in the ETCS requirements [17]. 
However, in ETCS, the message size varies, and it is 
usually smaller. Hence, the 128-B message size is con-
sidered as the worst-case scenario.
■■ Video transmission from selected trains to the con-
trol center (represented by one of the application 
servers): Video is proposed as a service for monitor-
ing train interiors for security purposes. The video 
Railway
Communication
Network
RBC
10
0 
m Application
Server
50
 m
Application
Server
Figure 4 a schematic view of the simulation topology. the green 
circles depict an approximate cell range. For clarity, only the middle 
section of the station is shown, with two out of ten enodeBs.
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application generated a 1,000-kb/s uplink stream (per 
train).
■■ Interphone (internal railway telephony) between train 
drivers and the control center: A single call generated 
uplink and downlink streams, each with a bit rate of 
64-kb/s [voice stream bit rate generated by the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union (ITU) G.711 codec]. 
The assumption was that each train driver makes a 
voice call to the control center every 900 s, on aver-
age. The call duration was 20 s, on average.
■■ Voice announcements were assumed to inform on-
board passengers about the current traffic situation. 
This was simulated by an application generating a 
64-kb/s downlink stream (ITU G.711 codec). 
Announcements were transmitted every 900 s, on 
average. Each announcement provided brief informa-
tion about traffic disruption, changes in the travel 
schedule, and so on. Hence, the announcements were 
short, and each lasted 5 s. 
■■ Discreet listening for security purposes: The applica-
tion generated a continuous uplink stream with a bit 
rate of 64 kb/s from each train (ITU G.711 codec).
The five applications differ in transmission require-
ments and their importance for train operation. Thus, 
a quality-of-service (QoS) mechanism is required to dif-
ferentiate between them. In LTE, the QoS mechanism is 
built around the concept of an EPS bearer [6]. Every UE 
uses one or more EPS bearers. Each of these bearers 
is specified by a QoS class indicator (QCI), which pre-
defines the most important transmission parameters for 
packets carried by the bearer, e.g., guaranteed bit rate 
(GBR), scheduling priority, packet error loss target, and 
delay target [25]. To ensure certain QoS, sensitive ap-
plications (e.g., ETCS) can be assigned to a high-priority 
GBR bearer. Other applications are carried over low-pri-
ority best-effort bearers (non-GBR). 
In the simulation model, three bearers were defined 
for each train. As shown in Table 2, ETCS packets were 
carried over a dedicated bearer of QCI 3. According to 
the standard [25], an LTE network should provide the fol-
lowing performance to a bearer of QCI 3:
■■ GBR (in this scenario, set to 16 kb/s)
■■ scheduling priority 3 (relative to other bearers)
■■ delay lower than 50 ms
■■ packet error loss rate below 10-3.
However, these are only performance targets. The 
network aims at providing such performance, e.g., by 
Table 1 The simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Frequency band1 5.9 ghz (5 mhz bandwidth)
enodeB maximum trans-
mission power
36 dBm
enodeB antenna height2 10 m
enodeB antenna gain3 15 dBi
uE antenna height2 4 m
uE antenna gain3 1 dBi
Path-loss model4 umi
multipath channel model5 Itu Pedestrian a
link adaptation error target 0.01%
ltE transmission mode6 transmit diversity (tm2) 
(enodeBs with 2 # 2 anten-
nas, uEs with 1 # 2 antennas)
uE category 1
1:  an assumption was made that part of the 5.9-ghz ItS band could be 
assigned for railway purposes [20]. 5 mhz is the ltE bandwidth closest 
in size to the 4-mhz bandwidth used by gSm-r.
2:  enodeB antennas were assumed to be placed near the ceiling of the sta-
tion building, while uE antennas were placed on the train roofs.
3:  enodeB and uE antenna gains were selected within a typical range as 
given in [21, p. 223].
4:  Itu-r m2135 urban micro (umi) [22] was chosen, since it models an 
urban scenario with buildings higher than location of enodeB. this is 
the case at the copenhagen main train station. moreover, this path-loss 
model supports 5.9-ghz frequency. the simulation chooses between 
line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight cases based on line-of-sight probabili-
ty as defined in [22]: ( / , ) ( ( / )) ( / ),min exp expP d d d18 1 1 36 36LOS $= - - + -
where d  is the distance between enodeB and uE in meters.
5:  the Itu Pedestrian a multipath channel model was chosen because the 
trains (uEs) were considered stationary.
6:  transmit diversity was chosen because it offers improvement in the 
received Snr (in contrast to other mImo modes, which improve 
throughput) [23]. hence, transmit diversity should contribute to a lower 
error rate of the radio transmission.
Table 2 The EPS bearer configuration.
EPS Bearer ETCS Voice Default Bearer
application(s) EtcS Interphone 
and voice 
announce
other
QoS class  
Identifier (QcI)
3 2 9
Bearer type gBr gBr non-gBr
guaranteed bit 
rate (uplink)
16 kb/s 64 kb/s —
guaranteed bit 
rate (downlink)
16 kb/s 64 kb/s —
allocation 
retention  
priority
1 5 9
Scheduling  
priority1
3 4 9
Delay budget1 50 ms 150 ms 300 ms
Packet error loss 
rate1,2
10-3 10-3 10-6
1:  values of these parameters are defined in a 3gPP standard [25].  
moreover, these values are only performance targets and are not strict 
requirements.
2: maximum error loss rate in a noncongested network.
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configuring packet schedulers and link layer according-
ly, but the network does not guarantee them under all 
circumstances [25]. This is because, in some situations, 
e.g., in the case of very poor radio conditions, neither 
scheduling nor link layer retransmissions are able to 
countermeasure a large packet loss.
Simulation Scenarios and Configuration Cases
Using the described simulation setup, three scenarios 
were prepared. The scenarios differed in the traffic 
load. This difference was created by varying the num-
ber of video streams transmitted in the uplink (from 
the train).
■■ Scenario 1 (light traffic load): No video traffic was 
sent in this scenario. The average utilization of LTE 
physical uplink shared channel (PUSCH) was 1.46%.
■■ Scenario 2 (medium traffic load): Video streams were 
sent from four trains (10% of all the trains). The aver-
age utilization of PUSCH was 35.24%. Note that the 
average utilization was not uniformly distributed 
among the cells. In the cells that carried the video 
streams, the average uplink utilization was 65.79%.
■■ Scenario 3 (traffic overload): Video streams were 
sent from all 40 trains. The average utilization of 
PUSCH was 98.87%. In a real-world situation, simul-
taneous video streams from all trains are unneces-
sary. It would be enough if a train station security 
supervisor could see simultaneously just a few 
chosen video streams. However, the purpose of the 
scenario with 40 video streams is to model over-
load conditions, when the LTE uplink shared capac-
ity is exceeded.
Each of the three scenarios was analyzed in five cas-
es—summarized in Table 3—which differed in the con-
figuration of the retransmission mechanisms:
■■ Case A: Only the MAC retransmission mechanism was 
enabled (three attempts allowed). 
■■ Case B: The MAC and RLC retransmission mechanisms 
were enabled (three attempts allowed at each layer).
■■ Cases C1–C3: The MAC, RLC, and ETCS retransmis-
sion mechanisms were enabled. At the MAC and RLC 
layers, three retransmission attempts were allowed. 
At the ETCS layer, between one (Case C1) and three 
(Case C3) retransmission attempts were allowed. The 
ETCS retransmission timer was set to 500 ms.
Simulation Results
Each of the three scenarios was analyzed in each of the 
five retransmission configurations. Thus, 15 cases were 
considered in total. Each simulation case was executed 
at least 70 times, with varying random seed numbers, 
until stable results were observed. Each simulation run 
lasted 15 min.
The probability of an end-to-end ETCS data loss ob-
served in the simulations is shown in Figure 5. 
Scenario 1
The first series in Figure 5 shows the results recorded in 
Scenario 1, which modeled a very lightly loaded net-
work. In the configuration Case A, the probability of an 
ETCS data loss was 7.08 # 10-4. In this configuration, 
ETCS traffic was not protected with any retransmission 
mechanism apart from the default HARQ (on the MAC 
layer). If three HARQ attempts were insufficient to deliv-
er a packet, then it was irreversibly lost. Also, if the 
packet loss occurred elsewhere than at the radio link, it 
was impossible to recover the lost data. Therefore, as 
expected, the data loss probability in Case A was the 
highest among all the configuration cases. 
In Case B, thanks to RLC retransmissions, the data 
loss probability fell to 3.02 # 10-6 (a reduction of 99.6%). 
The observed data loss was below the maximum loss 
acceptable by ETCS, which is 1 # 10-4 (marked with the 
red dashed line in Figure 5). Thus, in Scenario 1, an RLC 
retransmission mechanism was sufficient to fulfill ETCS 
data integrity requirement. In Case C, no data loss was 
observed—even with only one end-to-end retransmis-
sion attempt (Case C1).
Scenario 2
The second series in Figure 5 shows the results from 
Scenario 2, in which four video streams were transmit-
ted in the network. These video streams were used to 
monitor trains’ interiors for security purposes. In a real-
world situation, four streams from a single station 
should be sufficient to provide security for the train pas-
sengers. Thus, this is the most realistic scenario regard-
ing the network traffic.
The ETCS data loss probability was higher than in 
Scenario 1, but it followed the same tendency across 
various configuration cases. In Case A, the data loss 
probability was 1.4 # 10-3. In Case B, thanks to RLC re-
transmissions, it was lowered to 5 # 10-6 (reduction by 
99.6%). Thus, similarly as in Scenario 1, the data protec-
tion provided by RLC was sufficient to fulfill ETCS data 
integrity requirement. In Case C, when at least one end-
to-end retransmission was allowed (Case C1), ETCS data 
loss was not observed at all. 
Table 3 The maximum allowed retransmission attempts 
in the analyzed configuration cases. A dash means that 
the retransmission mechanism was off.
Case MAC Layer (HARQ) RLC Layer ETCS Layer
a 3 — —
B 3 3 —
c1 3 3 1
c2 3 3 2
c3 3 3 3
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Scenario 3
In Scenario 3, the network was overloaded with 40 
uplink video streams. This traffic overload significantly 
increased the ETCS data loss probability, as shown by 
the third series in Figure 5. In all of the cases, the proba-
bility of data loss was above the probabilities observed 
in the previous two scenarios.
In Case A, when only HARQ retransmissions were 
used, the ETCS data loss probability was 4.56 # 10-3. 
Then, in Case B, RLC retransmissions lowered the data 
loss probability to 1.63 # 10-4. Although the data loss was 
reduced by 96.4% compared with Case A, it remained 
above 1 # 10-4. Thus, in this overload scenario—oppo-
site to Scenarios 1 and 2—RLC retransmissions were not 
sufficient to fulfill the ETCS data integrity requirement.
In Cases C1–C3, an ETCS end-to-end retransmission 
mechanism was added on top of MAC and RLC retrans-
missions. When one end-to-end retransmission attempt 
was allowed, the data loss fell to 2.71 # 10-5, i.e., below 
the ETCS maximum acceptable limit. In Case C3, when 
three retransmission attempts were allowed, no data 
loss was observed.
The recorded packet loss values are high, but they are 
in the same range as values observed in LTE lab tests and 
field trials. In particular, in trial results published by An-
ehill et al. [26], the measured cell-edge packet loss was 
4 # 10-3. Also, in other field trials [27], the packet loss 
was found to be between 3 # 
10-4 and 2 # 10-3. Therefore, 
considering the worst-case 
assumptions made in the pre-
sented simulations, the ob-
served values are realistic.
Discussion of the Results 
from the Three Scenarios
At the RLC layer, data pack-
ets are split into smaller seg-
ments to fit into the current 
radio frame size. This seg-
mentation mechanism ampli-
fies the packet loss. This is 
because, even if only one of 
the segments is lost, the 
whole ETCS packet is dis-
carded, and ETCS data are 
lost. Moreover, it is possible 
that a radio frame carries 
segments from more than 
one packet. Then, a single 
lost frame can cause a loss of 
more than one packet. There-
fore, even a small loss at the 
lower layers [physical (PHY) 
layer, MAC, and RLC] may 
cause higher packet loss at the application layer. 
In the simulations, the trains (UEs) were concentrated 
at the cell edges. Due to that, there was a significant level 
of intercell interference, which degraded radio transmis-
sion and caused radio frame drops. As a consequence, 
the data (packets) carried by the dropped frames were 
also lost. This was the main cause of the ETCS data loss.
The more video was transmitted in the network, the 
higher the interference level, and, therefore, the higher the 
data loss. This is visible, for instance, in Case A: the data 
loss probability was considerably higher in Scenario 3 than 
in Scenario 1 due to the difference in the traffic load.
This interference issue could not be solved by the 
EPS bearer mechanism. This is because eNodeBs man-
age their respective radio resources independently. 
Each eNodeB follows the EPS bearer specification (see 
Table  2) and configures its packet scheduler and link 
layer in a way that should provide the specified trans-
mission performance for each bearer. Thanks to this, a 
high-priority ETCS packet will be scheduled before low-
er-priority traffic. Hence, ETCS is prioritized within each 
cell, and no other traffic should delay or interrupt ETCS 
traffic. However, since the eNodeBs are independent, the 
prioritization does not work between the cells. An eNo-
deBs is not aware of what type of traffic is transmitted 
in the neighboring cells. Thus, even though ETCS traffic 
is prioritized by the eNodeB and is transmitted ahead of 
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other traffic, the radio frames carrying an ETCS packet 
can still be heavily interfered by transmissions in the 
neighboring cells.
As proven by configuration Case A, the radio frame 
loss due to the interference was so high that it could 
not be solved effectively by the HARQ retransmissions. 
Therefore, the retransmissions at the higher layers 
were necessary.
The retransmissions at the RLC layer prevented most 
of the data loss. As visible in Case B—under low and me-
dium traffic load—the network fulfilled ETCS data loss 
requirement. In Scenario 3, the data loss exceeded the ac-
ceptable value, but only slightly. Although such overload 
conditions should not occur in a properly dimensioned 
network, a good ETCS performance must be guaranteed 
regardless of the network load. To achieve that, the end-
to-end retransmission mechanism is necessary. In Sce-
narios 1 and 2, one end-to-end retransmission attempt 
was sufficient to recover all data lost in the network. In 
Scenario 3, three end-to-end attempts were required.
It is worth noting that even if RLC retransmissions re-
covered all the data lost on the radio link, the end-to-end 
retransmissions would be still necessary. This is because 
data loss may occur in other parts of the network. Only the 
end-to-end mechanism can protect against such losses.
Besides using the retransmission mechanisms, an-
other strategy for lowering ETCS data loss is to directly 
address its main cause, the intercell interference. In LTE, 
this can be achieved with various interference-avoid-
ance mechanisms, such as [23].
■■ Intercell interference coordination (ICIC), which is 
based on the partial frequency reuse concept. ICIC 
allows eNodeBs to coordinate which part of the fre-
quency spectrum is used by each eNodeB near the 
cell edge. Thus, the interference at this vulnerable 
location is significantly reduced.
■■ Coordinated multipoint (CoMP), which allows multiple 
eNodeBs to simultaneously receive/transmit to an UE 
that is close to the cell edge. The UE receives a com-
bined signal from these few eNodeBs. Thus, thanks to 
CoMP, the signals from the neighboring eNodeBs 
improve reception instead of introducing interference.
■■ Carrier aggregation (CA), which is used to increase 
transmission bandwidth by aggregating multiple LTE 
frequency channels. The aim of this mechanism is to 
increase throughput, but CA can also be used to bal-
ance the traffic load across a wider frequency range. 
Thus, it may lower the interference.
By implementing these mechanisms, the intercell in-
terference would be reduced, and the data loss on the 
radio link would be significantly lowered.
Consequences for ETCS Operation
Failures and delays in ETCS communication have different 
consequences depending on the circumstances when they 
occur. The most disruptive are communication failures 
that force a running train to slow down or stop. As the 
train is running, it repeatedly receives the MA updates 
from the RBC. Every new MA informs the OBU about the 
new end-of-MA (EoMA) point, i.e., the point where the train 
must stop. As the train approaches the EoMA, the RBC pre-
pares a new MA and sends it to the OBU (depending on 
ETCS implementation, the RBC may send MA on the OBU 
request). If the new MA is not delivered at the appropriate 
time, the train must slow down and eventually stop to not 
overrun the EoMA point. Therefore, the closer the train is 
to the EoMA, the higher the risk that ETCS data loss will 
disrupt the train movement.
To minimize the risk of travel disruptions, the MA 
message is sent to the OBU some time before the train 
approaches the current EoMA. According to a technical 
report by ERTMS User Group [28], the MA update should 
take between 4 and 5 s, on average. However, signaling 
systems are designed under the worst-case assumption 
that the MA update takes up to 12 s. If the MA update time 
is shorter than 12 s, the train operation will not be affect-
ed negatively, i.e., no unnecessary braking will be made. 
During the MA update, approximately 2.5 s are consumed 
by the internal operations of the RBC and the OBU [28]. 
Hence, the delay in the communication network cannot 
exceed 1.5 s on average and 9.5 s maximum.
In the simulated LTE network, in the configuration 
with retransmission mechanisms off (Case A), the maxi-
mum MA transfer delay was 1.7 s. Simulation results 
show that up to three end-to-end retransmission at-
tempts were necessary to countermeasure the data loss 
in the network. Therefore, in the worst case, assuming 
three retransmissions and a 500-ms timeout, the maxi-
mum MA transfer delay should be as follows:
Attempts Timeout MaxDelay 3.2 s.+# .
This worst-case MA delay of 3.2 s is shorter than the 
maximum delay of 9.5 s. Therefore, even in an overloaded 
network, the modeled LTE network should offer ETCS per-
formance that guarantees uninterrupted train operation.
However, besides the intercell interference, there are 
also other things that may affect the reliability of ETCS 
communication. In the railway context, the primary 
challenge is sufficient radio coverage, which must be 
guaranteed despite difficult conditions—long distances 
requiring continuous coverage, high-speed UE mobility, 
and underground tunnels. These issues were discussed 
in the previous publications [5], [9], and [29], and, there-
fore, they were out of scope of this work. Another cause 
of communication problems may be external factors that 
cannot be controlled by the mobile network or its configu-
ration—for instance, strong and long-lasting electromag-
netic interference, software failure or hardware failure. 
These types of problems may be only addressed with the 
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proper network architecture using redundant hardware, 
redundant frequency bands, and multipath solutions [30]. 
Conclusions
ETCS signaling is one of the critical railway applications. 
Reliable delivery of ETCS messages ensures that the rail-
way signaling system is in a controllable and safe state. 
ETCS data integrity is one of the most important railway 
requirements on the underlying communication network.
Ensuring data integrity in a wireless network may be 
challenging, especially when the transmission resources 
are shared between various applications. Therefore, this 
article analyzed ETCS data integrity in a railway LTE net-
work under the worst-case conditions: densely deployed 
base stations, excessive traffic load, high train concen-
tration, and unfavorable train positions at the cell edges.
The simulation results demonstrated that ETCS data 
loss probability can be significantly reduced using radio 
and end-to-end retransmissions. Due to that, the mod-
eled LTE network fulfilled ETCS data integrity require-
ments despite the worst-case conditions.
All in all, a carefully designed LTE network is capable 
of fulfilling ETCS transmission requirements set by the 
railway industry.
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